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SUFFOCATE OR INNOVATE: AN 
OBSERVATION OF CALIFORNIA’S 




          Transactions involving cryptocurrency are rapidly 
gaining traction in the United States, prompting the need for 
regulation. Hence, California legislators proposed the 
cryptocurrency regulation Assembly Bill 1123. However, 
based upon the outcome of a virtually identical regulation in 
New York, this proposed bill is theoretically projected to 
stifle business growth and potential innovation. This Article 
focuses on one approach to remedy this by advocating for 
reform at the federal level and recommending the utilization 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In today’s generation of instant gratification, the central mission 
is often to discover the most convenient method of performing routine 
activities. One means to this end is cutting out the time and expense 
of the middleman to carry out our tasks, and instead re-establishing 
direct control. Concurrently, this would eliminate the need to blindly 
invest trust into a third party. In the midst of this ideology and the ever-
developing world of technology, cryptocurrency (virtual currency) 
emerged into the limelight. 
From its very inception, cryptocurrency was designed to cut out 
the middleman by delivering an exceedingly secure exchange of 
internet-based virtual currency without an intermediary such as the 
bank or government.1 However, with unchecked power comes abuse 
of authority. The freedom posed by unregulated virtual currency 
transactions soon prompted iniquitous schemes, such as the buying 
and selling of illegal commodities, enabled through the use of  
cryptocurrency on the dark web.2 The lack of a middleman presented 
challenges as more criminal activities involving a cryptocurrency 
called Bitcoin3 began to proliferate, compelling the nationwide debate 
over the necessity of cryptocurrency regulation. 
This Article will examine Assembly Bill 1123 (“A.B. 1123”), 
California’s proposed legislation surrounding virtual currency in the 
state. The Article argues that although cryptocurrency should be 
regulated, A.B. 1123, which requires businesses to obtain a license to 
engage in a virtual currency business activity, is much too restrictive. 
The California legislators should instead advocate for regulation at the 
federal level, utilizing the regulatory sandbox, which allows 
innovators to test their business models on actual consumers in a live 
environment without the risk of regulation enforcement action, as a 
 
 1. Omri Marian, A Conceptual Framework for the Regulation of Cryptocurrencies, 82 U. 
CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 53, 55 (2015); see also Sarah Meiklejohn et al., A Fistful of Bitcoins: 
Characterizing Payments Among Men with No Names, in IMC ‘13 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2013 
CONFERENCE ON INTERNET MEASUREMENT CONFERENCE (2013). 
 2. Carmine DiPiero, Deciphering Cryptocurrency: Shining a Light on the Deep Dark Web, 
2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1267, 1275 (2017); see, e.g., Donna Leinwand Leger, How FBI Brought Down 
Cyber-Underworld Site Silk Road, USA TODAY (Oct. 21, 2013, 6:11 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/21/fbi-cracks-silk-road/2984921/. 
 3. Bitcoin Project 2009–2018, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2018). 
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model of implementation.4 Though there are certain limitations 
designed to protect consumers and ensure smooth operation of the 
sandbox, this controlled environment gives businesses the latitude that 
they need to fully develop their innovative product or service.5 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II will discuss what 
cryptocurrencies are, specifically Bitcoin and Ethereum, and the 
innovative features that establish their marketability. Part III then 
focuses on the regulatory framework of virtual currencies in the 
United States, addressing general money transmittal laws as well as 
New York’s virtual currency law, known as the “BitLicense,”6 which 
California’s A.B. 1123 is modeled after. Part IV proposes a 
recommended course of action for California and explains how a 
transition to regulation at the federal level is conceivable. 
The Conclusion further addresses the listed suggestions for 
California’s next steps in guiding the future development of regulation 
and invites legislators to be cognizant of the systems of regulation 
used globally, particularly in regard to the regulatory sandbox. 
II.  CRYPTOCURRENCY 
Cryptocurrency is a digital or virtual currency that is similar to 
traditional paper money: they are both a medium of exchange that are 
used in the transaction of goods and services.7 However, unlike 
traditional currency, cryptocurrency is “untethered to, and 
independent from, national borders, central banks, sovereigns, or 
fiats.”8 The use and transmission of cryptocurrency occurs among 
members of the online community, and ownership of a unit of value is 
legitimized and encrypted through cryptography, which protects 
against tampering by third parties.9 
 
 4. Charlotte Hill, Inside the FCA’s Regulatory Sandbox, LAW360 (Sept. 20, 2016, 10:07 
AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/839557/inside-the-fca-s-regulatory-sandbox. 
 5. Pavel Shoust, Regulators and Fintech: Influence Is Mutual?, ELEC. MONEY, 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/770171476811898530/Session-4-Pavel-Shoust-Regulatory-
Sandboxes-21-09-2016.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2018). 
 6. Karen Freifeld & Gertrude Chavez-Dreyfuss, New York Regulator Issues Final Virtual 
Currency Rules, REUTERS (June 3, 2015, 8:45 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bitcoin-
regulation-new-york/new-york-regulator-issues-final-virtual-currency-rules-
idUSKBN0OJ23X20150603. 
 7. Vivian Maese et al., Cryptocurrency: A Primer, 133 BANKING L.J. 468 (2016). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, Advancing a Framework for Regulating 
Cryptocurrency Payments Intermediaries, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 495, 504 (2015); see also A. 
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A.  Bitcoin 
Currently, the most prominent cryptocurrency is the Bitcoin.10 To 
conceptualize the expeditious price surge of Bitcoin, the initial price, 
set in 2010, was less than one cent; by 2017, it exceeded $16,000.11 
This digital currency first developed in January 2009, and is an open-
source, peer-to-peer, decentralized system.12 Each unit of the virtual 
currency is essentially just an entry on a digital ledger.13 Every part of 
the transaction is ultimately controlled by the system users, each of 
whose identities are encrypted, effectively removing the necessity of 
a third-party intermediary.14 Though the users’ personal identities are 
encrypted, the transactions themselves are not fully anonymous.15 All 
transactions are accounted for and recorded onto a decentralized 
public ledger, called the blockchain.16 
In a basic transaction, the future owner of the desired Bitcoins 
must send his or her public “key” in the form of an algorithm to the 
original owner.17 After receiving this algorithm, the original owner 
digitally signs the transaction using cryptographic credentials and 
transfers the Bitcoins to the future owner.18 These transactions are then 
 
Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the 
Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 713–14 (1995). 
 10. Josiah Wilmoth, The 3 Most Popular Cryptocurrencies, STRATEGIC COIN, 
http://strategiccoin.com/3-popular-cryptocurrencies/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2018). 
 11. Olga Kharif, All You Need to Know About Bitcoin’s Rise, From $0.01 to $15,000, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 7, 2017, 9:04 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-01/understanding-bitcoin-s-rise-0-01-to-11-
000-quicktake-q-a. 
 12. EDWARD V. MURPHY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BITCOIN: QUESTIONS, ANSWERS 
AND ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES (2015) (“[Bitcoin is an] open-source (its controlling computer 
code is open to public view), peer-to-peer (transactions do not require a third-party intermediary 
such as PayPal or Visa), digital currency (being electronic with no physical manifestation).”); see 
also Julia Finch, From Silk Road to ATMs: The History of 
Bitcoin,  GUARDIAN (Sept. 14, 2017, 2:21 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/ 
sep/13/from-silk-road-to-atms-the-history-of-bitcoin. 
 13. Nathaniel Popper, Bitcoin Basics, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/business/bitcoin-basics.html. 
 14. MURPHY ET AL., supra note 12, at Summary. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 1; cf. Andy Greenberg, Your Sloppy Bitcoin Drug Deals Will Haunt You for Years, 
WIRED (Jan. 26, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/bitcoin-drug-deals-silk-road-
blockchain/ (contending that in numerous cases, researchers can connect someone’s Bitcoin 
purchase of a contraband on the dark web to that person’s public account). 
 17. EUR. CENT. BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES 23 (2012), 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf. 
 18. Id. 
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sent to “miners”19 via the network, who validate the transactions to 
prevent fraudulent activity.20 Virtually anybody can be a miner, as 
long as he or she has the computing power to unlock transaction data 
that is encrypted by a formula, which can only be solved through trial-
and-error guessing on an extensive scale.21 Being the first to validate 
a transaction results in a reward for the miner: a newly issued 
Bitcoin.22 This incentive compels individuals to join, support, and 
accurately update the network.23 New Bitcoins will be disseminated in 
such fashion until there are twenty-one million in circulation around 
the world.24 
Once a miner validates the transaction and it is verified by fellow 
miners, the data becomes part of the blockchain code,25 the “universal 
ledger of bitcoin transactions.”26 This forms an encrypted chain of 
ownership that is exceedingly difficult to alter or corrupt, ensuring the 
trustworthiness of the system.27 Since every block in the chain of 
ownership contains communally maintained data that are linked to 
earlier blocks, defrauding the system would entail revising countless 
links in the chain and evading miners that constantly work to verify 
each transaction.28 
B.  Ethereum 
The burgeoning success of the Bitcoin initiated a rapidly evolving 
movement in cryptocurrency and inspired the creation of similar 
technology—one noteworthy decentralized platform being 
 
 19. BITCOIN MINING, https://www.bitcoinmining.com/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2018) (“Mining 
is . . . the mechanism used to introduce Bitcoins into the system: Miners are paid any transaction 
fees as well as a ‘subsidy’ of newly created coins.”). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Kharif, supra note 11. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Popper, supra note 13; see also Daniel Krawisz, The Proof-of-Work Concept, SATOSHI 
NAKAMOTO INST. (June 24, 2013), http://nakamotoinstitute.org/mempool/the-proof-of-work-
concept/. 
 24. Popper, supra note 13. 
 25. Kharif, supra note 11. 
 26. Francois Velde, Bitcoin: A Primer, CHI FED LETTER, Dec. 2013,  
https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/chicago-fed-letter/2013/december-317. 
 27. EUR. CENT. BANK, supra note 17, at 23–24. 
 28. Kharif, supra note 11. 
(9) 52.3_KIM (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2019  11:17 PM 
2019] CALIFORNIA REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCY 345 
 
Ethereum.29 Just as the Bitcoin is its own virtual currency, the “Ether” 
is a form of payment that fuels Ethereum, a distributed application 
platform, using blockchain technology.30 
The distinguishing characteristic of Ethereum is in its application: 
the users are provided the possibility to create “smart contracts”—self-
executing protocols that essentially are agreements built into a 
computer code, and consequently stored on a blockchain.31 This 
enables developers to “create markets, store registries of debts or 
promises, move funds in accordance with instructions given long in 
the past (like a will or a futures contract)” without the use of a 
middleman or the risk that the counterparty might not uphold their end 
of the agreement.32 Smart contracts execute automatically according 
to the clauses in the contract when the agreed-upon conditions are 
met.33 Additionally, with the imminently extinctive need for attorneys 
or notaries, the obligation to wait for papers to be filed or to pay fees 
to those that would customarily oversee the transaction also becomes 
obsolete.34 Streamlining the process releases consumers from the 
constraints of business formalities and reinvents the name of 
efficiency. 
Ether’s purpose is to facilitate computation of a smart contract on 
Ethereum’s platform, while Bitcoin’s function is to serve as a currency 
or asset.35 With these new capabilities in the realm of virtual currency, 
the discussion of how to regulate such activity becomes increasingly 
important. 
 
 29. ETHEREUM, https://ethereum.org (last visited Oct. 27, 2018) (“Ethereum is a decentralized 
platform that runs smart contracts: applications that run exactly as programmed without any 
possibility of downtime, censorship, fraud or third-party interference.”). 
 30. Scott J. Shackelford & Steve Myers, Block-by-Block: Leveraging the Power of Blockchain 
Technology to Build Trust and Promote Cyber Peace, 19 YALE J. L. & TECH. 334, 354 (2017). 
 31. Id.; Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 
263, 263 (2017). 
 32. ETHEREUM, supra note 29. 
 33. What Is Ethereum? How Does It Work?, THE ECON. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017, 1:53 PM), 
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/stocks/news/what-is-ethereum-how-does-it-
work/articleshow/62169759.cms. 
 34. Jon Martindale, What Is Ethereum?, DIGITAL TRENDS (July 9, 2018, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/what-is-ethereum/. 
 35. ETHER The Crypto-fuel for the Ethereum Network, ETHEREUM, 
https://ethereum.org/ether (last visited Jan. 29, 2018). 
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III.  SURVEY OF THE UNITED STATES REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
RELATED TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY 
Article I of the United States Constitution grants Congress the 
authority to not only coin money, but also to regulate its value.36 While 
federal regulators are carefully assessing ways to confront the 
increasingly emphatic presence of virtual currency, law enforcement 
agencies are pressured into promptly producing solutions in light of 
the abuses and criminal activity involving digital currencies.37 In a 
June 26, 2015 speech at the American Bar Association’s National 
Institute on Bitcoin and Other Digital Currencies, Assistant Attorney 
General Caldwell stated: 
[V]irtual currency facilitates a wide range of traditional 
criminal activities as well as sophisticated cybercrime 
schemes. Much of the illicit conduct involving virtual 
currency occurs through online black markets such as the 
now-shuttered Silk Road, which operated on an anonymized 
“dark web” network that masked users’ physical locations, 
making them difficult to track. Similar online black markets 
continue to operate, offering on a global scale, a wide 
selection of illicit goods and services. While these have 
included more traditional crimes such as narcotics 
trafficking, stolen credit card information, and hit-men for 
hire, we have also seen a significant evolution in criminal 
activity . . . [such as] fund[ing] the production of child 
exploitation through online crowd-sourcing.38 
This statement demonstrates the extent to which individuals will go in 
a world free from government regulation and oversight, while 
concurrently emphasizing the importance of regulation. 
To expand on the illegalities that surround cryptocurrency, in 
2011, Ross Ulbricht founded the most notorious digital black market, 
 
 36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. 
 37. See Jason Bloomberg, Using Bitcoin or Other Cryptocurrency to Commit Crimes? Law 
Enforcement Is onto You, FORBES (Dec. 28, 2017, 12:18 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbloomberg/2017/12/28/using-bitcoin-or-other-cryptocurrency-
to-commit-crimes-law-enforcement-is-onto-you/#7dc9c16e3bdc. 
 38. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell 
Delivers Remarks at the ABA’s National Institute on Bitcoin and Other Digital Currencies 
(June 26, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-caldwell-
delivers-remarks-aba-s-national-institute. 
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termed the Silk Road, containing almost every conceivable 
contraband.39 It utilized Bitcoins to facilitate the marketplace, which 
was a haven for drug dealers, arms dealers, and document forgers.40 
The Silk Road was designed to be a free market outside the scope of 
government control, enabling the users to purchase contraband 
relatively anonymously.41 Although not completely untraceable 
because every transaction is recorded onto the blockchain, Bitcoin 
offered the level of anonymity that surpassed credit card transactions 
and other forms of currency, augmenting the Silk Road’s appeal for 
consumers in the black market.42 Within two and half years, the Silk 
Road became a hub for more than $1.2 billion worth of transactions, a 
substantial amount of which was used for heroin, cocaine, and lyseric 
acid diethylamide, more commonly known as LSD.43 Eventually, in 
2013, the Federal Bureau of Investigation tracked down Ulbricht and 
charged him for narcotics trafficking, computer hacking, and money 
laundering.44 Instances such as these illustrate the significance of 
regulation and highlight legislators’ need to take swift action. 
The existing federal regulatory structure includes anti-money 
laundering statutes and money transmission laws.45 The Bank Secrecy 
Act, which was the first major money laundering law in the United 
States, requires financial institutions, individuals, and banks to record 
information regarding particular customer transactions into Currency 
Transaction Reports.46 The reports must include information regarding 
deposits, withdrawals, and currency exchanges for transactions 
 
 39. Andrew Norry, The History of Silk Road: A Tale of Drugs, Extortion & Bitcoin, 
BLOCKONOMI (Nov. 20, 2018), https://blockonomi.com/history-of-silk-road/. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.; see also Greenberg, supra note 16. 
 42. Norry, supra note 39. 
 43. David Segal, Eagle Scout. Idealist. Drug Trafficker?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/19/business/eagle-scout-idealist-drug-trafficker.html.; see also 
Joseph Goldstein, Arrest in U.S. Shuts Down a Black Market for Narcotics, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/03/nyregion/operator-of-online-market-for-
illegal-drugs-is-charged-fbi-says.html?_r=0. 
 44. Tim Hume, How FBI Caught Ross Ulbricht, Alleged Creator of Criminal Marketplace 
Silk Road, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/04/world/americas/silk-road-ross-
ulbricht/index.html (last updated Oct. 5, 2013). 
 45. Kelsey L. Penrose, Banking on Bitcoin: Applying Anti-Money Laundering and Money 
Transmitter Laws, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 529, 537 (2014). 
 46. 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2012); History of Anti-Money Laundering Laws, DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/history-anti-money-
laundering-laws (last visited Oct. 11, 2018). 
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amounting to more than $10,000.47 By gathering information on the 
source, volume, and movement of currency, the reports allow law 
enforcement agencies to track large sums of money that could 
potentially be used for illicit activity.48 Additionally, the Money 
Laundering Control Act of 1956 criminalizes, at the federal level, 
those involved in financial transactions that represent unlawful 
activity.49 
In adopting this regulatory framework to the realm of 
cryptocurrency, the United States Treasury Department’s Financial 
Crime Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) broadened the applicability 
of the federal Bank Secrecy Act to cover virtual currency transactions 
in 2013.50 FinCEN defines a money transmission service as 
“acceptance of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for 
currency from one person and the transmission of currency, funds or 
other value that substitutes currency to another location or person by 
any means.”51 This applies to persons or businesses that create, accept, 
distribute, exchange, or transmit virtual currencies.52 
Additionally, the Bitcoin administrators and exchangers that, in 
fact, accept, transmit, buy, or sell virtual currency are considered 
money transmitters—persons that engage in the transfer of funds by 
accepting or transmitting anything of value, whether it be real 
currencies or virtual currencies—whom must comply with the 
Treasury Department’s registration processes.53 Beyond such 
guidance, “[f]ederal agencies moved cautiously with no plans to 
embark on a systematic regulatory scheme for cryptocurrencies.”54 
As the current money transmission and anti-money laundering 
statutes prove insufficient to placate the criminal threats posed by the 
existence of virtual currency, states proposed cryptocurrency-specific 
licensing requirements to heighten oversight. Each state has the 
 
 47. Penrose, supra note 45, at 537. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b) (2012). 
 50. See Memorandum from Dep’t of the Treasury Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network on Application 
of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies, 
(Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 9, at 509. 
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discretion to create and interpret virtual currency laws;55 this results in 
a divergence of whether licenses are required when engaging in virtual 
currency transactions between states. Among those that have 
commenced the push for licensure, New York and California are 
noteworthy states. 
A.  New York BitLicense 
New York’s Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) was the 
pioneer that pushed other states’ inclination towards adopting their 
own respective cryptocurrency regulations. NYDFS promulgated the 
“BitLicense” for regulating virtual currency businesses on 
June 3, 2015.56 These regulations were “intended to provide 
prudential licensing and regulations for cryptocurrency market 
participants and consumer protection . . . [from] cyber security issues 
surrounding the use of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies.”57 
Although the final proposal contains provisions on an expansive 
breadth of subjects, including licensure, capital requirements, and 
cybersecurity program requirements, this analysis will only focus on 
the basic principal features.58 
The BitLicense defines virtual currency as “any type of digital 
unit that is used as a medium of exchange or a form of digitally stored 
value.”59 Though it provides a broad latitude of interpretation, it does 
not include digital units that are handled exclusively on online gaming 
platforms, units that can be redeemed for goods or services, or used as 
gift cards.60 
The central groundwork of the BitLicense requires anyone 
determined to engage in “virtual currency business activity” to not 
only obtain a license, but also to file financial reports, subject 
themselves to potential examination, manage their records, and satisfy 
specific capital requirements.61 Those who obtain licenses are then 
 
 55. James Gatto & Elsa S. Broeker, Bitcoin and Beyond: Current and Future Regulation of 
Virtual Currencies, 9 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 429, 452–53 (2015). 
 56. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200 (2015). 
 57. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 9, at 536. 
 58. Regulation of the Conduct of Virtual Currency Businesses, 37 N.Y. Reg. 7 (June 24, 2015) 
(to be codified at N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 23, pt. 200), http://docs.dos.ny.gov/info/ 
register/2015/june24/pdf/rulemaking.pdf [https://perma.cc/VR2P-KCCU]. 
 59. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.2(p). 
 60. Id.§ 200.2(p)(1), (p)(2). 
 61. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 9, at 537. 
(9) 52.3_KIM (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2019  11:17 PM 
350 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:339 
 
additionally required to safeguard their customers’ interests by: (1) 
maintaining sufficient capital to ensure the financial integrity of the 
licensee;62 (2) preserving a surety bond or trust account for the 
customer’s benefit;63 and (3) refraining from selling, transferring, or 
otherwise using assets on behalf of another unless at that person’s 
direction.64 
In clarifying the terms of a virtual currency business activity, 
NYDFS set the parameters for activities involving New York or a New 
York Resident to include: 
(1)  receiving Virtual Currency for Transmission or 
Transmitting Virtual Currency . . . .; 
(2)  storing, holding, or maintaining custody or control of 
Virtual Currency on behalf of others; 
(3)  buying and selling Virtual Currency as a customer 
business; 
(4)  performing Exchange Services as a customer business; 
or 
(5)  controlling, administering, or issuing a Virtual 
Currency.65 
These parameters constructed the model by which subsequent states 
would frame their virtual currency legislation. 
B.  California’s Proposed Legislation for Virtual Currency 
The first prototype of cryptocurrency regulation in California was 
Assembly Bill 1326 (“A.B. 1326”), introduced in February 2015.66 
After becoming an inactive file due to heavy opposition, it was re-
activated in 2016 and, again, denied.67 Assembly Member Matthew 
Dababneh’s groundwork for this bill included the Money 
Transmissions Act and the New York BitLicense, used as model 
platforms.68 
 
 62. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.8(a). 
 63. Id. § 200.9(a), (b). 
 64. Id. § 200.9(c). 
 65. Id. § 200.2(q). 
 66. Assemb. B. 1326, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB1326. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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A.B. 1326, which would have enacted the Digital Currency 
Business Enrollment Program, was devised based upon the Money 
Transmission Act’s concept, requiring any person engaging in the 
business of money transmission to obtain a license from the 
Commissioner of Business Oversight (“Commissioner”) by paying a 
fee and completing an application form.69 The bill defined digital 
currency as a “digital representation of value that can be digitally 
traded and is used to facilitate the sale, purchase, and exchange of 
goods, or other digital representations of value.”70 It further defined a 
digital currency business as “offering or providing the service of 
storing, transmitting, exchanging, or issuing digital currency.”71 This 
not only would have applied to business entities, however organized, 
but also to individuals that engaged in such actions.72 Essentially, 
those seeking enrollment were, among numerous other preconditions, 
required to pay a non-refundable fee of up to $5,000, along with an 
annual fee of $2,500, supply specified personal and business 
information in an application form, and provide fingerprints to be 
delivered to law enforcement.73 Without enrolling in the program, a 
person would be prohibited from engaging in the digital currency 
business altogether.74 
Furthermore, the bill constrained users in a number of ways. 
Namely, it prohibited an enrollee from advertising products or services 
without issuing a statement regarding the program and obtaining 
approval from a government agency.75 The bill also required the 
enrollee to make a “variety of specified disclosures” to customers prior 
to each transaction, and then provide a receipt with particular 
information after such transaction.76 As in the New York BitLicense, 
this bill would additionally require the enrollee and its agents to 
subject themselves to investigation, and if found to be in violation of 
the provisions of the program, the Commissioner would have the 
authority to issue cease and desist orders.77 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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Faced with immediate resistance, principally from advocates of 
virtual currency, California was unsuccessful in implementing this 
regulation.78 The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a prominent 
proponent for innovation in the digital world, cited numerous issues 
inherent in A.B. 1326.79 These include that first, the bill is premature, 
since the digital currency industry is still in its developing stages.80 
Burdensome legislation could have unintentional, long-term 
consequences that potentially disadvantage consumers more than it 
benefits them.81 Second, the bill’s definition of “virtual currency 
business” is vague, deterring potential innovative businesses from 
launching.82 Third, the application requires extensive data from the 
applicant that is largely irrelevant to the targeted ideals of protecting 
consumers and facilitating the smooth application of virtual 
currency.83 And finally, the bill’s imposition of distinctive regulations 
per state could create confusion for consumers and leave them in a 
myriad of legal uncertainties, particularly because the fundamental 
characteristic of virtual currency is that it transcends state borders.84 
However, with the burgeoning presence of virtual currency coupled 
with the increasingly pressing need to regulate, Assembly Member 
Dababneh was persistent in proposing a “lasting regulatory framework 
that protects consumers and allows this industry to thrive,” inspiring 
Assembly Bill 1123.85 
Despite the heavy opposition to the original bill, the new 
California BitLicense bill renders the same requirements and 
philosophy as the previous proposals.86 A.B. 1123 would enact the 
 
 78. Joseph Young, EFF Opposes California’s Impractical Bitcoin Regulation BitLicense, 
COIN TEL. (May 4, 2017), https://cointelegraph.com/news/eff-opposes-californias-impractical-
bitcoin-regulation-bitlicense. 
 79. Rainey Reitman, A License to Kill Innovation: Why A.B. 1326—California’s Bitcoin 
License—Is Bad for Business, Innovation, and Privacy, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 7, 2015), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/08/license-kill-innovation-why-ab-1326-californias-bitcoin-
license-bad-business. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Matthew Dababneh, Assemblymember Dababneh Issues Statement on the Regulation of 
Virtual Currency, ASSEMBLYMEMBER MATTHEW DABABNEH (Aug. 15, 2016),  
https://a45.asmdc.org/press-release/assemblymember-dababneh-issues-statement-regulation-
virtual-currency [http://perma.cc/LFJ3-XQKF]. 
 86. Young, supra note 78. 
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Virtual Currency Act, which still requires a license from the 
Commissioner for those that desire to engage in the virtual currency 
business.87 
The bill establishes a new definition for the term virtual currency, 
which is “any type of digital unit that is used as a medium of exchange 
or a form of digitally stored value.”88 This is identical to the definition 
written in the New York BitLicense.89 Further, “virtual currency 
business” is now represented as “maintaining full custody or control 
of virtual currency in this state on behalf of others.”90 
Aside from these differences, the foundational structure remains 
virtually the same as A.B. 1326 with only slight modifications.91 
Applicants for licensure must pay a nonrefundable application fee and 
complete an application form that requires additional information 
beyond those listed in A.B. 1326.92 These include data regarding prior 
virtual currency services, a sample form of receipt for future 
transactions involving money received in virtual currency, a 
description of the applicant’s source of credit and money used to 
provide virtual currency services, and financial statements.93 
Further, in addition to annual fees remaining in place, licensees 
are required to make supplementary payments for the Commissioner’s 
expenses in administering the regulatory provisions of the bill.94 This 
includes periodic examinations of businesses to ascertain whether the 
owner is lawfully conducting his or her business and is maintaining 
proper records of all virtual currency activity.95  
In addressing further provisions purported to protect consumers, 
this version of the bill mimics the New York BitLicense: 
This bill would require each licensee to maintain at all times 
such capital as the commissioner determines, subject to 
specified factors, is sufficient to ensure the safety and 
 
 87. Assemb. B. 1123, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB1123. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.2(p) (2015).  
 90. Assemb. B. 1123, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB1123. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
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soundness of the licensee, its ongoing operations, and 
maintain consumer protection. The bill would require each 
licensee to maintain a bond or trust account in United States 
dollars for the benefit of its consumers in the form and 
amount as specified by the commissioner.96 
To determine the minimum amount of capital that must be 
maintained, the Commissioner considers factors such as the 
composition of the licensee’s total assets and liabilities, the expected 
volume of the particular virtual business activity, the amount of 
leverage employed, and the liquidity position of the licensee.97 
The provisions addressing random investigation by the 
Commissioner to ascertain whether the business complies with all 
laws, the Commissioner’s authority to impose penalties, including 
suspending or revoking licenses, and reports of specified disclosures 
to its consumers, remain almost identical to A.B. 1326.98 
C.  Effects of the New York BitLicense 
Because California’s proposed legislation modeled itself after the 
New York BitLicense, it is important to examine the advent and 
implementation of the New York BitLicense in 2015. The “prudential 
licensing” that New York lawmakers vowed to implement has, 
contrary to its intention, staunched business growth of cryptocurrency, 
leading to what is being referred to as the “bitcoin exodus.”99 The 
appeal of the BitLicense’s clear regulatory framework for 
cryptocurrency quickly diminished due to the sluggish licensing 
process as well as the rigidly restrictive requirements, which began 
driving companies away.100 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.; see also JP Buntinx, California’s Version of BitLicense Returns as Legal Proposal, 
NEWSBTC (Apr. 25, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.newsbtc.com/2017/04/25/californias-version-
bitlicense-returns-legislative-proposal-ab-1123/. 
 99. Michael del Castillo, The Next ‘BitLicense’ Will Impact All of Wall Street, N.Y. BUS. J. 
(Jan. 26, 2016, 10:09 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/newyork/news/2016/01/26/the-next-
bitlicense-will-impact-all-of-wall-street.html; see also Daniel Roberts, Behind the “Exodus” of 
Bitcoin Startups from New York, FORTUNE (Aug. 14, 2015), 
http://fortune.com/2015/08/14/bitcoin-startups-leave-new-york-bitlicense/. 
 100. Suzanne Barlyn, New York’s Bitcoin Hub Dreams Fade with Licensing Backlog, REUTERS 
(Oct. 30, 2016, 10:20 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bitcoin-regulations-dfs/new-yorks-
bitcoin-hub-dreams-fade-with-licensing-backlog-idUSKBN12V0CM. 
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Key members of the NYDFS, such as then-head of the department 
Benjamin Lawksy, who were responsible for the very development 
and design of the New York BitLicense, left the regulatory agency 
soon after the BitLicense’s implementation.101 Without the drafters’ 
guidance, the already stagnant license approval process was 
exacerbated by uncertainty on how the regulation should be 
enforced.102 
This uncertainty diverted companies from seeking approval or 
from even launching, consequently impeding the momentum of 
business innovation.103 More than a year since the implementation of 
the BitLicense, only two BitLicenses were issued, with fifteen 
applications pending, four withdrawn, and four denied.104 Companies 
already operating at the time the law came into effect continued to 
conduct their businesses while waiting for a license, but the risks 
imposed by the BitLicense inevitably thwarted efforts to raise capital 
or expand, especially for start-up companies.105 
The application process also proved exceptionally onerous for 
smaller companies lacking in resources.106 As intimated in Part III.A, 
the BitLicense costs $5,000 just to apply. The application can easily 
exceed five hundred pages, requiring copies of fingerprints, business 
models, ownership and personal information, and other documents 
often difficult to obtain.107 In large part due to the licensing backlog 
and the monetary and time-consuming burdens posed by the 
application, many companies announced their departure from New 
York, including Kraken, GoCoin, LocalBitcoins, and Genesis 
Mining.108 Genesis Mining, a cloud mining company, issued a 
statement that explicitly denounced the BitLicense: 
[The BitLicense is] complex, expensive, and comes with a 
set of guidelines that make it nearly impossible for any 
startup to comply with . . . . Genesis Mining will not be able 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id. 
 107. Id.; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.8(a) (2015). 
 108. Grace Caffyn, Genesis Mining Leaves New York Following BitLicense Deadline, 
COINDESK (Oct. 23, 2015, 5:24 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/genesis-mining-leaves-new-york-
following-bitlicense-deadline/. 
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to comply with the regulations set forth by the proposed 
BitLicense and as such, we will no longer be able to accept 
customers from the state of New York. All current customers 
will be able to continue their services, but going forward, no 
one with an IP address from the state of New York will be 
able to purchase hashpower contracts with us.109 
Kraken, a bitcoin exchange company, also commented before 
withdrawing its services from New York, stating that the BitLicense’s 
tolls exceeded the market opportunity of providing its business to New 
York residents.110 
IV.  PROPOSAL FOR CALIFORNIA’S NEXT STEP 
Because California’s Assembly Bill 1123 is nearly identical to the 
New York BitLicense,111 even mirroring much of the same language, 
the probability that A.B. 1123 will follow the same trajectory is 
considerably high. The same overbearing regulations and application 
costs will likely cause yet another “bitcoin exodus.” As state 
regulations follow a misconceived path, with New York spearheading 
the regulation efforts, the cryptocurrency industry’s future projections 
are ominous. As happened in New York, companies will potentially 
relocate to different states until they find a regulation that is agreeable 
with their own terms.112 
Moreover, allowing states to draft their own respective 
regulations has “resulted in a veritable patchwork of crypto-
ambivalent, crypto-friendly, crypto-hostile, and crypto-indifferent 
 
 109. Bitlicense: Red Flag Acts of Our Era, GENESIS MINING (Dec. 8, 2015), 
http://blog.genesis-mining.com/bitlicense-red-flag-acts-of-our-era; see generally GENESIS 
MINING, https://www.genesis-mining.com/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2018). 
 110. Charlie McCombie, Eight Months Since BitLicense’s Inception, Only One License Has 
Been Granted, COIN TEL. (Mar. 25, 2016), https://cointelegraph.com/news/eight-months-since-
bitlicenses-inception-only-one-license-has-been-granted; see generally KRAKEN BITCOIN EXCH., 
https://www.kraken.com/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2018). 
 111. Michael Scott, How Five States Are Approaching Bitcoin Regulation, BITCOIN MAG. 
(May 15, 2015, 9:52 PM), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/how-five-states-are-approaching-
bitcoin-regulation/. Compare Assemb. B. 1326, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB1326, with 
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. TIT. 23, § 200.8(a) (2015). 
 112. See generally Caffyn, supra note 108. 
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[states].”113 This lack of a uniform legal framework in the United 
States has not only deterred cryptocurrency businesses from 
establishing their roots in a single state, but it has also exacerbated 
problems of theft and fraud.114 As deference is currently given to each 
state, the U.S. government has a limited ability to protect users.115 A 
uniformity in rules would consequently allay blockchain companies’ 
concerns of erratic and oppressive policy changes, and provide for 
easier administrability of regulations put in place as safeguards from 
theft.116 
In light of the predictably unpromising effects of the proposed 
regulations, California legislators need to consider options that are 
more beneficial to the collective financial technology industry in the 
United States. Accordingly, California should reject the proposed 
legislation, and instead, the state legislators and commentators should 
advocate for reform at the federal level, in consonance with what other 
countries have done. 
In numerous countries, federal agencies play a significant role in 
administering the financial technology industry, many of which utilize 
an effective tool for regulation called the regulatory sandbox.117 The 
regulatory sandbox is a compelling example of the way the United 
States could implement regulation at the federal level. With this, not 
only would all states follow the same standard, but the regulatory 
sandbox would also promote innovation, rather than create regulatory 
barriers. 
A.  Regulatory Sandbox 
The regulatory sandbox is a “safe space” where firms can test 
their services, products, and business models on real consumers 
without being subjected to the standard burden of regulation and its 
 
 113. Rachel McIntosh, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Crypto Regulation in the USA, FIN. 
MAGNATES (Sept 1, 2018, 9:14 AM), 
https://www.financemagnates.com/cryptocurrency/news/good-bad-ugly-crypto-regulation-usa/. 
 114. Id.; see, e.g., Aziz Abdel-Qader, Tether, Bitstamp Most Likely Hacked by the Same Person, 
FIN. MAGNATES (Nov. 21, 2017, 9:38 PM), 
https://www.financemagnates.com/cryptocurrency/news/tether-bitstamp-huobi-likely-hacked-
person/. 
 115. See McIntosh, supra note 113. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., REGULATORY SANDBOX NOVEMBER 2015, 5–6 (2015), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/regulatory-sandbox.pdf. 
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consequences.118 The term “sandbox” originates from the software 
development sphere: it is a “tool that allows developers to test a 
technological proof of concept prior to a full-scale public release.”119 
This gives the developers an opportunity to make amendments to their 
product based on consumer feedback before any foreseeable 
circumstance invalidates their product.120 The sandbox concept would 
be directly adopted by firms entering the financial services market, 
enabling them to test their ideas in a controlled environment without 
risking the current financial system or jeopardizing consumer 
protection.121 Essentially, it is a vacuum for potential missteps and 
mismanagement for firms that are in the embryonic stages of 
launching.122 
In addition to assessing “the impact of regulations on [each 
firm’s] profitability and overall business model,” this process provides 
assurance to potential risk-adverse investors that it is a tested and 
reliable model.123 The sandbox delivers an ideal juxtaposition of 
increased investments and decreased compliance costs.124 The 
insulated environment protects institutions from the risk of being 
heavily fined for financial misconduct and from lack of risk-
management practices.125 This not only facilitates support for start-up 
companies, but also encourages established firms to introduce 
innovative commodities that may not yet comply with existing 
regulations.126 Consequently, the regulatory sandbox will foster 
innovation by ensuring a protected sphere for those that are hesitant to 
unveil their product or service due to regulatory uncertainty.127 
Regulators, however, do need to take certain precautions: 
 
 118. Hill, supra note 4. 
 119. FinTech and Regulatory Sandboxes in the UK, Hong Kong and Singapore, SIDLEY 
AUSTIN LLP (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2017/09/fintech-
and-regulatory-sandboxes. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.; VAIBHAV ANAND & SANJEEV SHAH, DELOITTE, Regulatory Sandbox Making India a 
Global Fintech Hub 16 (2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/in/Documents/ 
technology-media-telecommunications/in-tmt-fintech-regulatory-sandbox-web.pdf. 
 122. See FinTech and Regulatory Sandboxes in the UK, Hong Kong and Singapore, supra note 
119. 
 123. ANAND & SHAH, supra note 121, at 16. 
 124. Id. at 21. 
 125. Id. 
 126. FinTech and Regulatory Sandboxes in the UK, Hong Kong and Singapore, supra note 119. 
 127. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 117, at 5. 
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While there are good reasons to explore regulatory 
sandboxes, policy makers should be prepared to face 
challenges. Most importantly, operating a regulatory 
sandbox requires adequate human and financial resources to 
select proposals, provide guidance, oversee experiments and 
evaluate innovations. Regulators may lack these resources in 
many [emerging markets and developing economy] 
countries. Therefore, policy makers need to pay attention to 
details and carefully consider their options.128 
In analyzing the application of a new regulatory scheme, countries 
need to be wary of the weight of responsibility inherent in the sandbox. 
As aforementioned, important factors to acknowledge when 
examining the viability of implementing a regulatory sandbox include 
the amount of financial resources, as well as the manpower it takes to 
carry out the tasks that the sandbox requires. 
1.  How the Sandbox Operates 
The basic operation of a regulatory sandbox is as follows: first, 
the regulator develops broad guidelines and expectations—a tailored 
regulatory framework—along with threshold eligibility requirements 
for the firms that desire to participate.129 These requirements generally 
include the foundational guidelines of genuine and novel innovation, 
direct consumer benefit, extensive scope of potential support to 
consumers within the financial services industry, a legitimate need for 
testing within the sandbox, and testing readiness from completed 
research regarding risks and regulations.130 A public notice is then 
circulated, inviting firms to apply to participate in the regulatory 
sandbox.131 The regulatory agency then carefully evaluates the 
applications based on their business model or product offering, and on 
how well the firms conform to the above-mentioned eligibility 
criteria.132 
 
 128. Ivo Jenik, Regulatory Sandboxes: Potential for Financial Inclusion?, CGAP 
(Aug. 17, 2017), http://www.cgap.org/blog/regulatory-sandboxes-potential-financial-inclusion. 
 129. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., REGULATORY SANDBOX LESSONS LEARNED REPORT OCTOBER 
2017 4 (2017), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research-and-data/regulatory-sandbox-lessons-
learned-report.pdf.; ANAND & SHAH, supra note 121. 
 130. ANAND & SHAH, supra note 121, at 16-20; see, e.g., FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 
129; see also Hill, supra note 4. 
 131. ANAND & SHAH, supra note 121. 
 132. Id. 
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From the applicant pool, a limited amount of companies are then 
selected to participate for a specified period of time, during which they 
test their product or service in a live environment and collaborate 
closely with the regulators to determine the salability of the 
commodity.133 The regulators also work individually with the firm to 
explain how they would “interpret the requirements in the context of 
[the firm’s] specific test.”134 Once a firm successfully exits the 
sandbox, they must submit a report addressing the outcomes of the 
testing; if they subsequently choose to deploy their product into the 
financial market, their product or service must then adhere to all the 
established regulations.135 
a.  Countries that have implemented the regulatory sandbox 
Numerous countries have implemented a regulatory sandbox, of 
which the major players include the United Kingdom, Australia, 
Singapore, and Hong Kong. 
i.  United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), a 
regulatory body for the financial market, initiated the regulatory 
sandbox program as part of a broader initiative, Project Innovate, to 
“foster competition and growth in financial services by supporting 
both small and large businesses that are developing products and 
services that could genuinely improve consumers’ experience and 
outcomes.”136 The FCA introduced the default parameters for 
regulatory sandbox testing.137 These include: 
(a)  Duration: The appropriate duration for testing is three to 
six months. 
(b)  Number of Customers: Customer set considerations 
should balance the ability to obtain statistically relevant data 
with the possibility of risk to customers. 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Sandbox Tools, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulatory-
sandbox/sandbox-tools (Dec. 15, 2017). 
 135. ANAND & SHAH, supra note 121; see also FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 117, at 1. 
 136. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 117, at 1. 
 137. Hill, supra note 4. 
(9) 52.3_KIM (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2019  11:17 PM 
2019] CALIFORNIA REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCY 361 
 
(c)  Customer Selection: The firms must source appropriate 
customers themselves, taking into account the type of 
service, the intended market, and the potential risks involved. 
(d)  Customer Safeguards: The customer safeguards are 
determined on a case-by-case basis—the FCA usually takes 
into consideration the type of customers, the technicalities of 
the trial, as well as the magnitude of risk. 
(e)  Disclosure: The firms offering informed consent should 
disclose information regarding the test and its compensation. 
(f)  Testing Plans: These should include the timeline of the 
test, their measures of success, the testing parameters, 
appropriate customer safeguards, risk assessment, and an exit 
strategy for the consumers.138 
Furthermore, the FCA offers three risk-management tools to 
provide regulatory relief.139 First, the regulators can provide individual 
guidance on the interpretation of the relevant rules, tailored to the firm 
and its operation.140 If the firm conforms with the given instruction, 
“the FCA will proceed on the basis that they have complied with the 
relevant aspects of [the FCA’s] rules to which the guidance relates.”141 
Second, the FCA can utilize the power to waive or modify the rules. 
If the testing activities do not comply with the rules because they 
would be “unduly burdensome,” the regulator can issue a waiver, as 
long as it does not adversely affect the progress of the FCA’s 
objectives.142 However, there is a limitation to the waiver: it cannot 
violate the bounds of the existing European Union legislation.143 
Changes to the United Kingdom’s legislation are not made for the 
sandbox’s operation. 
Lastly, for cases in which the first two options are not viable, the 
FCA can issue a “no enforcement action letter,” stating that “no FCA 
enforcement action will be taken against testing activities where [the 
 
 138. Default Standards for Sandbox Testing Parameters, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/default-standards-for-sandbox-testing-parameters.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 11, 2018). 
 139. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 117, at 9. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Christopher Woolard, Dir. of Strategy & Competition, Fin. Conduct Auth., Speech at the 
Innovate Finance Global Summit (Apr. 11, 2016), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/innovate-finance-global-summit. 
 142. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 117, at 9 n.8. 
 143. Id. at 9. 
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FCA is] reasonably satisfied that the activities do not breach [the 
FCA’s] requirements or harm [the FCA’s] objectives.”144 The 
assurance of no disciplinary action only applies for the duration of the 
sandbox testing period.145 
Upon observation of the regulatory sandbox’s legitimate 
application, in the first two cohorts, fifty applications of 146 were 
accepted, and forty-one were actually tested within the first year of the 
sandbox operation.146 Distributed ledger technology, such as the 
blockchain, was the most prominently employed technology within 
the first two cohorts, with seventeen firms applying the technology in 
some fashion, usually in electronic money institutions.147 
To illustrate, Billion, one of the selected companies, is an 
electronic money platform that uses blockchain technology to transfer 
and hold funds securely using a phone application, and BitX is a 
cryptocurrency transfer service and trading platform.148 The FCA 
acknowledged the benefit of these services—faster transaction times 
and manageable exchange rates—but also made sure to protect the 
consumers participating in the sandbox process by requiring the firms 
to have full refunds readily available in the event that the currency was 
lost in transmission.149 
Overall, from the first cohort, 75% of the firms successfully 
completed the testing, and 90% of those firms attempted to institute 
their business in the broader financial market.150 Approximately one-
third of the tested firms made substantial adjustments to their business 
models, such as more nuanced consumer protection safeguards, after 
utilizing knowledge procured from the sandbox process.151 Though it 
is too premature in the process to make conclusive judgments 
regarding the regulatory sandbox’s impact on the overall market, the 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 129, at 6; see also Dan Cummings, FCA Testing 
Blockchain Technology in Pilot Program, ETHNEWS (Feb. 16, 2017, 11:44 AM),  
https://www.ethnews.com/fca-testing-blockchain-technology-in-pilot-program (describing the 
number of applications and the companies selected for the FCA’s first cohort). 
 147. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 129, at 9; see also Cummings, supra note 146 (listing 
the nine blockchain-based companies that participated in the first cohort). 
 148. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., REGULATORY SANDBOX – Cohort 1, https://www.fca.org.uk/ 
firms/regulatory-sandbox/cohort-1 (June 15, 2017); Cummings, supra note 146. 
 149.  FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 129, at 10–11. 
 150. Id. at 5. 
 151. Id. at 6. 
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FCA stated that the testing does indicate promising progress towards 
greater competition and a higher quality output of products and 
services.152 
ii.  Australia 
Australia’s regulatory sandbox framework is administered by the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s (ASIC) 
Innovation Hub.153 ASIC is an independent commonwealth 
government body that regulates corporate, markets, financial services 
and consumer credit,154 while their Innovation Hub was specifically 
created to aid financial technology companies in navigating the 
regulatory system.155 ASIC provides mechanisms of relief in a format 
very similar to the FCA’s regulatory sandbox. 
Within the “fintech licensing exemption,”156 offered only to 
specified products and services,157 ASIC provides a waiver, allowing 
financial technology businesses to participate in the regulatory 
sandbox without any required license for a maximum of twelve 
months.158 There is no application process—as long as the business 
meets the eligibility requirements and adheres to the conditions of the 
sandbox, the company is legally entitled to rely on this exemption.159 
These conditions do not veer far from the default standards set out in 
 
 152. Id. at 10. 
 153. Regulatory Sandbox, AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N, http://asic.gov.au/for-business/your-
business/innovation-hub/regulatory-sandbox/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2018). 
 154. Our Role, AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N, http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/what-we-do/our-
role/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2018). 
 155. Innovation Hub, AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N, http://asic.gov.au/for-business/your-
business/innovation-hub/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2018). 
 156. AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N., REGULATORY GUIDE 257: TESTING FINTECH PRODUCTS 
AND SERVICES WITHOUT HOLDING AN AFS OR CREDIT LICENSE 14 (2017), 
https://download.asic.gov.au/media/4420907/rg257-published-23-august-2017.pdf (“[W]e have 
made ASIC Corporations (Concept Validation Licensing Exemption) Instrument 2016/1175 and 
ASIC Credit (Concept Validation Licensing Exemption) Instrument 2016/1176, which allow 
eligible businesses to test certain products and services for 12 months without needing to obtain an 
AFS licence or credit licence, respectively. Collectively, we refer to these instruments as the 
‘fintech licensing exemption.’”). 
 157. Id. at 17–19. 
 158. Licensing Exemption for Fintech Testing, AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N (Aug. 2017), 
https://download.asic.gov.au/media/4112096/licensing-exemption-for-fintech-testing-
infographic.pdf; Regulatory Sandbox, supra note 153 (explaining that two other options for testing 
the product or service, include relying on existing statutory exemptions, or otherwise on individual 
relief from ASIC for other services). 
 159. Innovation Hub, supra note 156, at 14. 
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the United Kingdom’s regulatory sandbox; they include a limit of one 
hundred retail clients, sufficient compensation arrangements in the 
case of loss, a dispute resolution system, exposure limits, and 
consumer protection measures.160 The protection measures entail full 
disclosure to the clients if the business does not have a license, if the 
services provided are being tested under the fintech licensing 
exemption, or if the regular protections when dealing with services 
provided from a licensee do not apply.161 
iii.  Singapore 
In implementing the regulatory sandbox, the Monetary Authority 
of Singapore’s (MAS) target audience was financial technology firms, 
financial institutions, and professional service firms that endorsed 
such businesses.162 The evaluation criteria used to assess each 
application is, again, very similar to those of the United Kingdom: the 
proposed financial service should involve innovative technology and 
aim to fix a problem or provide a benefit; the applicant should intend 
to deploy the service or product beyond the parameters of the sandbox; 
the testing scenarios, boundary conditions, and desired outcomes must 
be defined; the company must be cognizant of and consequently 
mitigate the potential risks; an exit strategy must be planned in case of 
discontinuation; and a transition strategy should be defined in case of 
conversion to the broader financial market.163 
With this implementation, the Singaporean government made a 
clear statement that it was a proponent of financial technology 
innovation.164 Although this statement encourages investments for 
innovation and attracts start-up companies to penetrate the Southeast 
Asian market, it comes at a cost.165 The MAS stated that it would 
expend $166 million over five years towards the creation of innovation 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 23. 




 163. Id. at 5–6. 
 164. Don Weinland, Hong Kong to Create Fintech ‘Sandbox’ Allowing Bank Experiments, FIN. 
TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/38a662ee-740f-11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a. 
 165. Id. 
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centers and technology projects, effectively spearheading its efforts 
into becoming a viable adversary of the technology revolution.166 
iv.  Hong Kong 
Less than three months after Singapore introduced the regulatory 
sandbox, its “regional rival,” Hong Kong, announced its participation 
in the same program to preserve its reputation as a relevant competitor 
in the financial technology sphere.167 The Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority (HKMA) launched the Fintech Supervisory Sandbox, but 
departed from the typical layout.168 The program is “only offered to 
established banks seeking to explore distributed ledger technology and 
fintech solutions.”169 Start-up companies are generally not accepted, 
unless they partner with an existing authorized banking service.170 
The baseline safeguards of setting boundaries for the trial run, 
incorporating customer protection measures, being aware of and 
mitigating the risks, and readiness for testing are all still maintained.171 
Once the bank or company is a participant of the sandbox, the 
innovators have considerable regulatory room for modifying their 
product or service; the HKMA does not intend to impose an extensive 
list of supervisory requirements onto the participants.172 
B.  Federal Regulation in the United States 
There are several United States federal regulatory agencies that 
are virtually equivalent to the FCA in the United Kingdom, ASIC in 
Australia, MAS in Singapore, and HKMA in Hong Kong, which can 
potentially operate the regulatory sandbox. Specifically, either the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the 
 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Dan Cummings, Regulatory Sandboxes: A Practice for Innovation that Is Trending 
Worldwide, ETHNEWS (Feb. 28, 2017, 5:10 PM), https://www.ethnews.com/regulatory-
sandboxes-a-practice-for-innovation-that-is-trending-worldwide. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See id.; Fintech Supervisory SandBox (FSS), H.K. MONETARY AUTH., 
http://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-functions/international-financial-centre/fintech-supervisory-
sandbox.shtml (last updated Oct. 2, 2018); see generally Letter from Arthur Yuen, Deputy Chief 
Executive, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, to Chief Executive of all Authorized Institutions 
(Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-information/guidelines-and-
circular/2016/20160906e1.pdf. 
 171. Fintech Supervisory SandBox (FSS), supra note 170. 
 172. Letter from Arthur Yuen, supra note 170. 
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United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) are 
feasible candidates. 
The SEC’s mission is to oversee the markets, facilitate capital 
information, and to protect investors.173 In the midst of this, the SEC 
has recognized that cryptocurrency is gaining widespread recognition; 
however, the SEC “has not to date approved for listing and trading any 
exchange-traded products . . . holding cryptocurrencies or other assets 
related to cryptocurrencies.”174 This is not to say that cryptocurrency 
does not fall within the SEC’s purview—the SEC issued an 
investigative report stating that the sale of digital assets by virtual 
organizations utilizing blockchain technology fall under the federal 
securities law.175 SEC Chairman Jay Clayton has also made it clear 
that the SEC will keep “sharp focus” on how cryptocurrencies affect 
the securities markets.176 This focus on the market has already lead the 
SEC to take action in a specific case, temporarily suspending trading 
in shares of The Crypto Company, a company that provides the public 
direct exposure to global blockchain development growth,177 whose 
stock surged more than 2,700% in one month.178 
As for the CFTC, its purpose is to cultivate financially stable and 
competitive markets while concurrently protecting consumers, the 
public, market users and their funds from any type of fraud or unlawful 
practice.179 The CFTC monitors derivative markets for potential 
abuses and supervises a range of entities, including futures 
commission merchants and swap execution facilities.180 To further the 
CFTC’s qualification as a regulatory sandbox administrator, a United 
 
 173. About the SEC, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about.shtml (last 
modified May 21, 2018). 
 174. Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-
2017-12-11. 
 175. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Investigative Report Concluding 
DAO Tokens, a Digital Asset, Were Securities (July 25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-
release/2017-131. 
 176. Clayton, supra note 174. 
 177. See CRYPTO COMPANY, https://www.thecryptocompany.com/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2018). 
 178. Michael Sheetz, The SEC’s Crackdown on Cryptocurrencies Is About to Get Serious, 
Former Chairman Says, CNBC (Dec. 21, 2017, 6:34 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/21/sec-
crackdown-on-cryptocurrencies-is-about-to-get-serious-ex-chairman.html. 
 179. Mission & Responsibilities, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, 
http://www.cftc.gov/About/MissionResponsibilities/index.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2018). 
 180. Id. 
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States district court judge in New York supported the CFTC’s 
authority in regulating cryptocurrencies as commodities:  
Virtual currencies can be regulated by CFTC as a 
commodity. Virtual currencies are “goods” exchanged in a 
market for a uniform quality and value . . . . They fall well-
within the common definition of “commodity” as well as the 
[Commodity Exchange Act’s] definition of “commodities” 
as “all other goods and articles . . . [sic] in which contracts 
for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.”181 
With the CFTC gaining oversight over the futures market and the 
underlying trading platform, its regulatory powers currently function 
alongside, rather than in competition with, the SEC regulation 
discussed above.182 The SEC does not have direct oversight of the 
transactions in commodities, but some cryptocurrencies contain 
attributions that characterize them as securities.183 For example, the 
offer, sale, and trading aspects of these cryptocurrencies must adhere 
to securities laws.184 Consequently, the SEC works to expose those 
who threaten the integrity of the securities laws by means of evading 
the registration, antifraud, and disclosure requirements.185 Both the 
SEC and CFTC, along with other federal and state regulators and 
criminal authorities, work collectively to bring transparency to the 
markets and to deter fraud.186 
Assuredly, this concept of federal oversight is already gaining 
traction. SEC Chairman Jay Clayton addressed the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs at an open 
session on February 6, 2018 on the topic of the SEC and CFTC’s 
oversight role of virtual currencies: 
It appears that many of the U.S.-based cryptocurrency 
trading platforms have elected to be regulated as money-
 
 181. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 228 (E.D.N.Y. 
2018); see also Wolfie Zhao, Cryptos Are Commodities, Rules US Judge in CFTC Case, COINDESK 
(Mar. 7, 2018, 10:40 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/us-judge-rules-cryptocurrencies-are-
commodities-in-cftc-case/. 
 182. See Jay Clayton & J. Christopher Giancarlo, Regulators Are Looking at Cryptocurrency, 
WALL STREET J. (Jan. 24, 2018, 6:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/regulators-are-looking-
at-cryptocurrency-1516836363. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
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transmission services. Traditionally, from an oversight 
perspective, these predominantly state-regulated payment 
services have not been subject to direct oversight by the SEC 
or the CFTC . . . . As Chairman Giancarlo, [the CFTC 
chairman] and I, [Chairman Clayton], stated recently, we are 
open to exploring with Congress, as well as with our federal 
and state colleagues, whether increased federal regulation of 
cryptocurrency trading platforms is necessary or appropriate. 
We are also supportive of regulatory and policy efforts to 
bring clarity and fairness to this space.187 
U.S. regulators supported the SEC and CFTC chairmen’s statement 
that Congress should consider federal oversight because 
“cryptocurrency trading has outgrown the state-based regulation that 
covers many platforms.”188 The chairmen acknowledged that the mere 
patchwork attempt at regulation and the lack of a comprehensive 
structure, provokes a necessary policy discussion.189 Although no 
concrete changes came to fruition following the hearing, it sparked a 
meaningful dialogue with U.S. regulators on the ineffectual medley of 
state regulations and the possible step towards federal regulation. 
The SEC and CFTC’s oversight and guidance in the financial 
technology market is important and should be supplemented by efforts 
to create an adaptable regulatory environment. As the cryptocurrency 
market is quickly evolving, there is a pressing need for flexibility 
within the market.190 Just as the United Kingdom, Australia, 
Singapore, and Hong Kong did, either the SEC or CFTC should 
institute a regulatory domain, such as the regulatory sandbox, that 
fosters innovation, while maintaining their original mission of 
protecting both the market and the consumers, and supporting the 
principles of the investor. 
 
 187. Virtual Currencies: The Oversight Role of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, 
Hous., & Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. 3 (Feb. 6, 2018) (statement of Jay Clayton), 
https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Clayton%20Testimony%202-6-18.pdf. 
 188. Dave Michaels & Gabriel T. Rubin, Patchy Bitcoin Oversight Poses Hazards for 
Investors, Regulators Say, WALL STREET J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/patchy-bitcoin-
oversight-poses-hazards-for-investors-regulators-say-1517913001 (last updated Feb. 6, 2018, 
11:38 AM). 
 189. Id. 
 190. See Clayton & Giancarlo, supra note 182. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
California should reject the proposed cryptocurrency legislation, 
Assembly Bill 1123, that is modeled after New York’s BitLicense, 
which has proven to be problematic and ineffective. Further, not only 
is the legislation itself restrictive, potentially driving out 
cryptocurrency businesses, but also the concept of each state having 
its own respective regulation is inadequate when managing consumer 
protection. The lack of a uniform legal framework deters 
entrepreneurs and investors from participating in the cryptocurrency 
realm, exacerbates problems of fraud and theft, and curtails 
consumers’ confidence in the government’s efforts to protect their 
economic interests. 
The preferred path is for reform at the federal level. Several 
countries, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Singapore, and 
Hong Kong have developed regulatory sandboxes that can serve as a 
guide. In each of these countries, a federal regulatory body has 
retained responsibility for cryptocurrency oversight of the sandboxes: 
Financial Conduct Authority, Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, Monetary Authority of Singapore, and Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority, respectively. 
The United States consists of federal regulatory bodies that are 
more than capable of managing a regulatory sandbox, particularly 
either the Securities and Exchange Commission or the United States 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Both Commissions 
presently oversee the financial market, and are familiar with 
cryptocurrency regulation, as the almost instantaneous rise of virtual 
currency forcefully demanded their attention. 
The concept of the regulatory sandbox is admittedly still at a 
nascent stage, but it is attracting innovation and investors. It enables 
firms entering the financial services market to test their proposals in a 
controlled environment without jeopardizing both the consumer and 
the broader financial market. Implementing the regulatory sandbox, or 
at least utilizing it as a framework for future regulation, can potentially 
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